Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War by Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
COWARDS AND HEROES:









We have benefited from the comments of Daron Acemoglu, Eli Berman, Stanley Engerman, Edward Glaeser,
Daniel Hamermesh, Dean Karlan, Joanna Lahey, Jesse Shapiro, Peter Temin and seminar participants at the
2001 NBER/DAE Summer Institute, the MIT organizational lunch, and Boston University. Dora Costa
gratefully acknowledges the support of NIH grants AG12658 and AG10120. The views expressed herein are
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
' 2001 by Dora L. Costa and Matthew E. Kahn.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including ' notice, is
given to the source.Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War
Dora L. Costa and Matthew E. Kahn
NBER Working Paper No. 8627
December 2001
JEL No. L39, Z13, N31
ABSTRACT
What motivated men to risk death in the most horrific war in U.S. history when pay was low and
irregular and military punishment strategies were weak? In such a situation creating group loyalty by
promoting social capital is of paramount importance and in the Civil War was the cement of both armies.
We find that individual and company socio-economic and demographic characteristics, ideology, and
morale were important predictors of group loyalty in the Union Army. Company characteristics were
more important than ideology or morale. Soldiers in companies that were more homogeneous in ethnicity,
occupation, and age were less likely to shirk.
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The Civil War was the most horriﬁc war in United States history. The total number of deaths in
the Civil War equaled the total number killed in almost all other wars combined and more than
one out of every ﬁve white men participating died, over half of them from disease (Vinovskis
1990). The combatants faced death, the hardships and monotony of camp life, and distance from
loved ones, all for low and irregularpay. One soldier wrote, “I have cursed the day I have enlisted
for what beniﬁt [sic] will I ever drive from being a Soldier. the common Soldier will not reap the
Harvest of Victories but it is some other men that will gain all Praise Honor and Wealth.”1 Had
he deserted, he would have faced only a 40 percent chance of being caught and a negligible risk
of death if arrested (Linderman 1987: 174, 176). A self-interested soldier would have deserted.
But, over 90 percent of all Union Army soldiers did not (Linderman 1987) and among Union
Army soldiers whose three year enlistment terms were up, half of them re-enlisted (McPherson
1997: 81-82). What motivated these men to soldier on?
This paper investigates the determinants of group loyalty, studying the relative impor-
tance of individual and community characteristics, of ideology, and of morale in determining
group loyalty among Union Army soldiers. Loyalty can be expressed through cowardice and
heroism. The measures of “cowardice” are desertion, arrests, and absences without leave. A
measure of “heroism” is promotion from private to ofﬁcer, though not deserting could also be
regarded as heroism. This paper provides the ﬁrst large-scale quantitative assessment of the
correlates of cowardice and heroism based upon soldiers’ deeds rather than their words. An
unusually rich dataset provides us with detailed demographic and economic characteristics of in-
dividuals, ofcompanies, and ofthe geographicalareas fromwhich individualscame. We ﬁndthat
1Letter of John S. Voltz to his brother, 2/10/1865, University Libraries of Virginia Tech,
http://scholar2.lib.vt.edu/spec/voltz.
1individual and company socio-economic and demographic characteristics, ideology, and morale
were important predictors of group loyalty in the Union Army.
Our analysis provides insights into ﬁrmorganizationaldesign. A distinguishingcharac-
teristicbetween themilitaryandthe modernﬁrmis the military’sinability(exceptfora mercenary
army)to fully compensate individuals forrisk and to linkpay to performance.2 In an organization
where workershave discretion and unobserved effortmatters, altruism for others and the need for
others’ respect will mitigate the agency problem. Social capital is therefore an important input
into having a productive organization.3 O’Reilly, Caldwell, and Barnett (1989) ﬁnd that in work
units where social integration is high, turnover is low. Social capital is also important for the
economy as a whole. La Porta et al. (1997) show that worldwide trust is associated with more
efﬁcient judiciaries, less corruption, and higher quality government bureaucracies. Knack and
Keefer (1997) ﬁnd that trust predicts economic growth and Guiso et al. (2000) ﬁnd that it predicts
ﬁnancial development.
Studying the Union Army has many advantages over previous studies of shirking and
effortinorganizations. Oneadvantageisthatthestakesarehigh. Itiscostlyforamilitarycompany
if an individual shirks. It is also costly for soldiers to do their duty, thus allowing researchers
to obtain a better measure of commitment than ﬁrm turnover rates or questions on membership
in organizations, the measures commonly used in the social capital and organizational behavior
literature. Secondly, it is easier for team members to observe and for researchers to measure
shirking in the military than in a modern ﬁrm. Thirdly, the way companies were organized
provides us with an ideal study design. Our data contain a large number of companies (303),
2Although the armies of Frederick the Great feared their ofﬁcers more than their enemies, this has never been
true in the United States.
3Socialcapital isdeﬁned as aspects ofthe socialstructuresuch as trust,networks,and conventionsthatencourage
collaborationand coordinationbetween friends and strangers (Coleman 1990).
2but because each company consists of roughly 100 men, each is small enough so there can be
relatively little Tiebout sorting within the company. Because companies were built on a local
community basis, companies are heterogeneous whereas they would not be if there were random
assignment. However, each company is large enough so that there cannot be perfect Tiebout
sorting bygroups of friendswithin companies. Finally, because the job of a soldier was unskilled,
largely consisting of learning the movement of linear formations, of obeying orders without
hesitation, and of mastering the 9 steps of loading a musket and ﬁring in the direction of an
enemy hidden by the smoke of the battleﬁeld (Hess 1997: 18-19, 137), worker skills are perfect
substitutes.
2 Demand and Supply of Organizational Loyalty
All organizationsface potential agency problems. Solutions formitigatingsuch problemsinclude
backloading pay, using promotions as an incentive, and paying bonuses to individuals (Lazear
1979: Gibbons 1998). But, Civil War soldiers who survived expected to be discharged from the
war-time military when their enlistment term was up, were lucky if their pay arrived on time,
and faced a higher risk of death on the battleﬁeld if promoted because ofﬁcers led the charges.
Military outcomes are produced in a team setting, in which one or more regiments win or lose
a battle. In such a case where only team output is observed and individual effort is not, a for
proﬁt can use pay for performance incentives to induce the efﬁcient level of individual effort
(Holmstr¨ om1982). Unlikesuch an organization, the militarysubstitutes loyaltyforhigh powered
incentives.4
4Assuming that output is measuring in terms of battles won, the efﬁcient contract would ﬁne soldiers within a
company after they lost a battle (see Theorem 3 in Holmstr¨ om (1982)), but this would lead to widespread desertion
when the expectation of victory was low.
3Why are soldiers loyal? Soldiers’ survival instincts should lead them to shirk, but
altruism for men in their companies, the desire for the respect of men in their companies and in
their communities, and belief in the cause will lead them to risk their lives on the battleﬁeld.5
If men do not believe in the cause and do not care for the esteem of others (or fear their social
sanctions), it is rational to shirk. Concern with personal honor depends in turn upon men’s
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and on the characteristics of the organization.
Because belief in the cause is less costly when one’s side is winning, morale will also determine
committment to a military organization. Based upon his reading of soldiers’ letters, McPherson
(1997) argued that Civil War soldiers were sustained by convictions of duty, honor, patriotism,
and ideology, impulses of courage and self-respect, and by ﬁghting units’ group cohesion and
by peer pressure in their home communities. In reply to questionnaires, WWII enlisted soldiers
cited ending the task, solidarity with the group, thoughts of home and loved ones, and a sense of
duty and self-respect as the most important factors in movitating them to keep going (Stouffer et
al. 1949: 109). In contrast, Bearman (1991) argues that among men from North Carolina, local
homogeneity led to high desertion rates.
3 Empirical Framework
















5Writingof World War II soldiers, Marshall (1947: 150) observed, “Personal honor is the one thingvalued more
than life itself by the majorityof men.” McPherson (1997: 77) ﬁnds the phrase “death before dishonor”in CivilWar
letters and diaries innumerable times.
4Table 1: Determinants of Group Loyalty
Individual Community Ideology Morale
Social status Birth place fragmentation Year mustered in Percent in company dying
Occupation Occupational fragmentation Volunteer status Fraction Union victories
Family wealth Age diversity From pro-Lincoln county
Literacy Size of city of enlistment
Nativity Brother in company
Native-born Percent of own nativity






Since we do not explicitly measure social capital, we substitute Equation 2 into Equation 1 and
model loyalty as a function of individual characteristics, community characteristics, ideology,
and morale. Table 1 lists the sets of variables determining group loyalty. We will examine the
relative impact of these four types of variables on group loyalty, measuring loyalty using days
until desertion, AWOL, arrests, and promotion to ofﬁcer and examining days until one of these
events using a competing risks framework.
Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of soldiers affect group loyalty be-
cause they shape soldiers’ ideology and affect their productivity within an organization. As
noted in Table 1, these characteristics include birth place, marital status, age, and social status
(as proxied by occupation, family wealth, and literacy). Birthplace and social status inﬂuence
ideas of patriotism, honor, and duty. Older soldiers may be more disciplined. Married men may
be either more or less motivated to ﬁght by the thought of loved ones. Studies of American
soldiers in World War II found combat performance to correlate positively with social class and
education, age, and being married (Stoufferet al. 1949: 36-37). In the case of Civil War soldiers,
5the sense of duty and honor and the potential for public shame was probably greater among the
more socially prominent. Germans who ﬂed the revolutions of 1848 may have been more likely
than Irish or British immigrants who migrated for economic reasons to view the United States
as the best hope for the survival of a form of republican government. Protestant Germans were
more likely to be Republican than the Irish because a large proportion of Republican voters were
anti-Catholic Know-Nothings (Fogel 1989: 384). Financial hardship at home led some married
men to desert, but this was probably truer of Confederate soldiers whose families faced food
shortages (McPherson 1997: 138). The importance of individual characteristics to individuals’
commitment to organizations is observed in civilian life as well. The modern military and the
humanresourcedepartmentsofcorporationsselect individualsonthebasis oftheircharacteristics.
Ichino and Maggi (2000) ﬁnd that region of birth, age, education, tenure, and promotion rate are
important predictors of worker absences and misconduct. Group loyalty requires interactions
with fellow workers or community members, but committment to interacting with others varies
by demographic group (Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote 2000).
Communitycharacteristicsinﬂuencegroupparticipation. Previousstudiesexaminedthe
effectofcommunitycharacteristicsonpublicexpenditures(Luttmer2001; Poterba1997; Alesina,
Baquir, and Easterly 1999; Goldin and Katz 1999) and on time allocation and organizational
membership (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2001). In contrast, we examine
willingness to risk death. Our primary measure of a soldier’s community is the company he
was in. We examine the effect of such company characteristics as birth place fragmentation,
economic fragmentation (proxied by occupational fragmentation), age diversity, and the percent
of the company of own ethnicity and occupation on group loyalty. We also investigate the impact
of other deﬁnitions of community, including whether the soldier had a brother, father, or son
in the same company and population size of city of enlistment. Some studies (e.g. Watson
1978: 117) have argued that the most effective military squads are those that are psychologically
6homogeneous. Within heterogeneous units team production may therefore be harder because
there is less social integration and less informal communication and because communication is
less frequent. Team production may also be harder because social sanctions are less effective.
The notion that intense loyalty, to the point of self-sacriﬁce, to a small band of comrades is
soldiers’ primary motivation for ﬁghting became widespread among sociologists, psychologists,
and military historians after World War II (McPherson 1997: 86). Because soldiers live with
the same men for so long, endangering the group leads to personal guilt and ostracism within
the group. Some have argued that this group loyalty was also evident among Civil War soldiers,
wherefeelingsofloyaltywerecompoundedbycommunitypressuresince fellowsoldiers fromthe
same hometown could and did report on others’ behavior (McPherson 1997: 77-89). Empirical
evidenceexaminingindividualinteractionshasfoundthatthemoresimilararepairsofindividuals,
the higher is trust (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter 2000). Studies of ﬁrms have found
that heterogeneity in age, education, tenure, race, and sex is positively related to turnover, but
which of these heterogeneitymeasures is more importantdepends upon the organizationstudied.6
We cannot tell apriori whether such measures of community heterogeneity as fragmentation
indexes are better predictors of group loyalty than the percent of the company of own ethnicity or
occupation.
Althoughweassumethatsocialcapitalisaproductiveinputintogrouployalty,werealize
that there could be a “dark side” of social capital such that greater homogeneity contributes to
shirking and to favoritism. There is evidence that by sustaining local area loyalties, company
heterogeneity bred higher desertion rates (Bearman 1991).
Ideological fervor bolsters loyalty and will therefore mitigate the agency problem.
Questionnaires administeredto Americanvolunteers inthe Spanish CivilWar foundthat ideology
6See Pfeffer (1997: 83-85) for a review. Sørenson (2000) argues that it is not just current but also previously
experienced demographic heterogeneity withina ﬁrm that matters.
7was the single most important factor helping men to overcome fear in battle (Dollard 1943: 55),
whereasamongWorldWarIIsoldiersitplayedonlyasmallrole(Stoufferetal.1949: 109). During
the American Civil War, not just own ideology but also ideology of the soldiers’ hometown was
an important factor. Soldiers’ morale depended not just upon good news from the front, but also
upon their families’ and communities’ support. We measure ideology using year of enlistment,
volunteer status, and percent of the county voting for Lincoln. Men who enlisted after 1962
were commonlydescribed as beingwithout patriotism, honor, orinterest in the cause (McPherson
1997: 9). The constituencies voting for Lincoln were diverse, consisting of anti-Catholics,
farmers, and land reformers, among others, opposed to slavery on both economic and moral
grounds (Fogel 1989: 369-387). Soldiers’ committment to the cause may have grown the longer
they served in the army. When Lincoln ran for re-election he received 78 percent of the soldier
vote compared to 53 percent of the civilian vote, despite some 40 to 45 percent of soldiers having
come from Democratic families in 1860 (McPherson 1997: 176). We can test whether soldiers’
committmentincreased by examiningwhether cowardicehazards decrease with time and whether
heroism hazards increase with time.
Another important determinant of group loyalty is the morale of the troops. Morale
will depend upon support from the home front, leadership, and also upon the own unit’s and
the entire Army’s success on the battleﬁeld. The ideologically committed men who served in
the Spanish Civil War cited defeats, retreats, and heavy casualties, ignorance of objectives and
lack of reliable news, and poor food, clothing, and shelter as the most common conditions in
which demoralizing rumors were likely to spring up (Dollard 1943: 53). Morale is a dynamic
variable. In 1865 desertion reached epidemic levels in the Confederate Army when it was clear
that the Confederacy could not win. In the Union Army, desertion reached a high point after
the removal of McClellan in November 1862, the defeats at Fredericksburg and at Chickasaw
Bluffs in December 1862, the rise of the peace Democrats at home, and the controversy over
8emancipation. Morale revived with victories at Gettysburg and at Vicksburg in July of 1863,
though continued gyrations were in store for the troops (McPherson 1997: 155-162).
4 The Union Army
On the eve of the Civil War, the regular army consisted of only 15,000 enlisted men.7 By the
end of the war over 2 million men had served in the Union Army, with four out of ﬁve men
born in the prime birth cohorts of 1837-1845 serving. From April 1861 to July 1862 the army
depended solely upon volunteers enlisting for low pay. In July 1862, the Militia Act assigned
quotas to each state to ﬁll and these in turn assigned quotas to towns. When patriotic appeals
failed, states and towns began offeringmen bounties to induce them to enlist so that they could ﬁll
theirquotas. InMarch 1863theEnrollmentActcreateda conscriptionsystem administeredbythe
federal government. Quotas were assigned to each congressional district and then broken down
into subdistricts within each district. When towns failed to meet their quotas, every able-bodied
male citizen between the ages of 20 and 45 became eligible for the draft, though married men
were less likely to be called. Draftees could hire a substitute to take their place or they could
pay a commutation fee of $300 (equal to the yearly wage of an average worker) to be exempt
from that particular draft, though not from another. Draftees and substitutes were relatively rare,
constituting no more than 10 percent of all soldiers. Paying a commutation fee was also rare.
Only 87,000 men became exempt in this way.
States and individuals played a large role in the formation of regiments of volunteers,
the basic units of the armies. The volunteer infantry regiments consisted of 10 companies, each
7See Hattaway (1997), Gould (1869), and U.S. Provost Marshall General (1866) for a detailed discussion of the
organization of the CivilWar Armies and Linderman (1987), Kemp (1990), Mitchell(1990), and McPherson (1997)
for discussions of soldiers and their communities.
9containing roughtly 100 men, commanded by a captain and two lieutenants, often volunteer
ofﬁcers drawn from state militias, men of political signiﬁcance, or assorted prominent men in the
community. Professional ofﬁcers were not necessarily more skilled in military matters because
the West Point curriculum emphasized engineering rather than military tactics. Regiments were
typicallyformedfrommenwhocamefromthesame area. Each companywouldgenerallycontain
bands of men who had known each other in civilian life.8 Mitchell (1990) argues that this way of
recruiting was not accidental. The voluntary organization of small communities into a national
army, the amalgation of civic pride and national patriotism, was how the volunteers imagined
the Union should function. Because of the strong loyalties men felt toward their companies, a
company was not replenished with new men when disease, military casualties, and expirations of
enlistment terms whittled down a company’s numbers. If a company’s numbers were sufﬁciently
reduced, the company disappeared and the men who continued to ﬁght would transfer to another
company.
Soldiers reported home on the cowardice, courage, and moral behavior of their com-
rades, thus bringing home peer pressure to bear on men’s behavior. Companies maintained
constant contact with their home communities through local newspapers and letters that never
had to pass a censor’s desk, arrivingwith the same speed as mail today unless soldiers were in the
deep South. Companies could also increase social integration among like-minded individuals.
Soldiers formed debate societies and organizations of Christian associations.
The Union Army was not held together by discipline. Citizens visited their friends in
camp at all hours of the day. Except for some camp drills, most men and company commanders
learned on the job. When ofﬁcers were men soldiers had known all their lives, the men had
8Finding a company that was a good match could be a matter of luck. One soldier wrote home, “We have a
remarkable civil and Religious company ... i think it is a providencial circumstance that I enlisted in this company
for I hear that there is desperate wickedness in very regiments i came so near enlisting in.” (Letter of David Close,
November 4, 1862, 126th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Company D, http://www.iwaynet.edu/lsci/
10trouble thinking of ofﬁcers as their superiors and were slow to or refused to follow orders. The
ofﬁcers who commanded respect were those concerned for the welfare of their men and those
who demonstrated personal courage and a willingness to do themselves what they asked of their
men. Those who commanded contempt resigned their commissions, driven out by the ill-will of
their men.
The Army’scoercive powers were limited. As the war progressed, the Armydesignated
units of provost guards to drive stragglers (men who milled at the rear) into line. However,
because they were reluctant to shoot soldiers wearing the same uniform, they were not always
effective. Similarly,executions for such serious penalties as desertion were relativelyrare. Out of
roughly 200,000 deserters, 80,000 were caught and returned to the army and 147 were executed
for desertion (Linderman 1987: 174, 176). Executions were loathsome both to soldiers and to
civilians. Instead the penalties for desertion, and also AWOL, generally ranged from ﬁnes and
loss ofpaytoimprisonment(includingwithhardlabor)toperformanceofthemoreonerousduties
in the company to the social sanctions of men’s home communities.
5 Data
Our data consist of 31,854 white, enlisted men in 303 Union Army infantry companies.9 The
sample represents roughly 1.3 percent of all whites mustered into the Union Army and 8 percent
ofall regimentsthat comprisedthe UnionArmy. The data arebased upona randomsample of331
companiesdrawn atthecompanylevel.10 Ninety-onepercentofthe sampleconsists ofvolunteers,
9The data were collected by Robert Fogel and are available from http://www.cpe.uchicago.edu.
10Oursample islimitedto303companies because completedata have notyetbeencollected onall331companies.
Among the original331 companies, New England is under-represented and the Midwest over-represented relative to
the army as a whole. The companies that have not yet been collected are from Indiana and Wisconsin, states that
were unusually committed to the Union cause.
11with the remainder evenly divided between draftees and substitutes. In terms of real estate and
personal property wealth, the sample is representative of the 1860 age-adjusted population (Fogel
2001). The primary data source consists of men’s military service records. These records
provide such basic information as year of muster, age, birthplace, and height in inches, and also
information on what happened to the soldier during his military service. Desertions, arrests, and
AWOLswere handledbymilitarycourtsconvenedin theﬁeld. Men werelinkedtothe manuscript
schedules of the 1860 census which provides information on the value of personal property for
all individuals in the household and on illiteracy and allows us to infer marital status. (Linkage
details are provided in the Appendix.) We merged data on population in city of enlistment and
voting in the 1860 presidential election (see the Appendix for sources). We include region ﬁxed
effects for New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, Border, and
West.
Table 2 illustrates the wide variation in shirking and mortality rates by state. Shirking
washighintheborderstates ofKentuckyandMaryland. Ofparticularnotearethe highpromotion
rates in Wisconsin and Iowa.
We constructed variables describing recruits’ individual characteristics, the characteris-
tics of their communities, their ideological fervor, and theirmorale (see the Appendix for details).
Our individual variables consist of occupational class, country of birth, age, height in inches (a
measure of productivity), the soldier’s marital status in 1860, total personal property wealth in the
soldier’s 1860 household, and whether the soldier was illiterate. Our communityvariables consist
of company birthplace fragmentation, company occupational fragmentation, the coefﬁcient of
variation for age for the company, and the size of the town the recruit enlisted in. Soldiers from
large cities who shirked were more likely to be able return to their home towns without facing
social sanctions from the whole town. We also created community variables for the percent of
the company of a given ethnicity or occupation and for whether the recruit had a brother in the
12Table 2: Percent Serving by State and Percent Deserted, Arrested, AWOL, Promoted to Ofﬁcer,
and Died in War by State
% Serving % Deserted % Arrested % AWOL % Promoted % Died
Connecticut 1.65 3.13 1.86 3.05 0.00 1.84
Maine 1.31 0.67 2.32 0.86 0.61 1.80
Massachusetts 1.65 0.94 1.70 1.05 0.61 1.90
New Hampshire 1.85 3.07 2.17 3.62 0.30 2.97
Vermont 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41
Delaware 1.39 1.70 1.86 0.57 0.30 0.86
New Jersey 2.77 6.66 5.11 1.33 0.30 1.52
New York 19.81 26.09 31.11 30.03 12.12 20.53
Pennsylvania 9.41 9.49 3.87 4.86 1.52 7.78
Illinois 12.18 10.82 6.35 8.10 6.06 13.47
Indiana 4.22 3.10 2.17 5.15 9.39 4.43
Michigan 4.50 3.53 3.41 3.05 2.42 5.07
Ohio 17.48 13.77 7.89 15.92 13.64 18.31
Wisconsin 4.36 1.34 2.79 1.72 17.88 3.08
Iowa 4.32 1.00 4.18 3.05 20.30 6.46
Kansas 0.82 0.24 0.62 0.19 3.03 0.19
Minnesota 0.93 0.30 0.46 0.48 0.91 0.26
Missouri 3.20 2.77 3.10 2.38 6.67 3.93
Kentucky 2.84 4.96 1.55 9.06 1.21 3.21
Maryland 0.92 1.89 1.39 2.10 0.00 0.83
Washington, DC 0.37 0.49 1.70 1.24 0.00 0.02
West Virginia 1.05 0.27 0.62 1.24 0.00 0.49
New Mexico 0.30 0.70 2.01 0.10 0.00 0.02
California 1.73 3.07 11.76 0.86 2.73 0.62
31,850 observations. Arrests and AWOLs are those preceding desertion only.
13company. Our ideology variables consist of the year the soldier was mustered in, his volunteer
status, and the percent of all votes in the soldier’s county of enlistment for Lincoln (a measure
of the soldier’s own and the community’s ideology). Our measures of morale are both company
speciﬁc and for the Army as a whole and consist of the fraction of the company who died for
each half year that the soldier was in the company and the fraction of Union victories to all
major battles for each half year that the soldier was in the service. Both of these variables are
time-varying covariates. Note that the fraction of Union victories to major battles does not vary
across companies and only varies across individuals who were mustered in at different dates. We
do not treat the other company variables as time-varying covariates because there was very little
change in company characteristics from the start to the end of their service. Note that we cannot
include company leader characteristics as a variable because we know leader characteristics only
for internal promotions.
Table 3 lists all variables used in the regression tables and shows that the sample
means for those who deserted, were arrested, were AWOL, and were promoted to ofﬁcer differ
substantially from those for the entire sample. To simplify the tables we do not include as
covariates the fraction of the company that is of soldier’s own ethnicity or occupation or whether
the soldier had a brother in the company; instead, we describe the results in the text. Among
shirkers,theindividuallevelvariablesthatdifferareoccupation,birthplace,andhouseholdwealth.
The community level variables that differ are company birth place fragmentation, occupational
fragmentation, and coefﬁcient of variation for age, and population size in city of enlistment. The
ideology variables that differ are year of muster, volunteer status, and the percent of votes cast for
Lincoln. Shirking also occurs when the company death rate is high and when Army-wide morale
is low. Those promotedto ofﬁcerwerenative-bornprofessionals and proprietorswho volunteered
in 1861 and who were from high mortality companies.
14Table 3: Variable Means for All Men, for Deserted, for Arrested, for AWOL, and for Promoted
to Ofﬁcer
All Deserted Arrested AWOL Promoted
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Dummy=1 if volunteer 0.907 0.842
z 0.895 0.893 0.997
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Vote for other 34.777





















z indicate that the mean is signiﬁcantly different from the mean for those not in the category at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Arrests and AWOLs are those preceding desertion only. The logarithm of
personal property wealth is set equal to zero for those for whom this information is missing. The standard deviations
of log(total household personal property), birth place fragmentation, occupational fragmentation, the coefﬁcient of
variation for age, the percent in the company dying, and log(population) are 2.699, 0.204, 0.181, 3.193, 8.667, and
1.874, respectively.
156 Econometric Framework
Our measures of cowardice and heroism are desertion, arrest, AWOL, and promotion to ofﬁcer.
Desertion is the best measure of shirking. Arrests and promotions depend upon ofﬁcer decisions.
Desertion is a moreserious offense than AWOL and, because 10 percent of the sample deserted, it
also is the measure with the largest number of outcomes. Absences without leave were generally
failing to return from furlough on time and straggling from the company. Arrests that were not
for desertions or AWOL were for drunkenness, assault, robbery, insubordination, and sleeping
while on picket duty.
Our empirical strategy uses a time-varying competing risk hazard model to estimate
days from entry into the company (muster-in) until desertion, arrest, AWOL, or promotion to
ofﬁcer. We use a competing risk framework because some men may have died, been discharged,
changed company, become prisoners of war, or be missing in action before they could desert.
Similarly, some men may have died, been discharged, changed company, become prisoners of
war, be missing in action, or have deserted before arrest, AWOL, or promotion to ofﬁcer (see
Figure 1). Hazard models provide a framework to estimate the micro and macro determinants of







































where I indexes the individual variables, C indexes the community variables, D indexes the





) is the baseline hazard which we










) for subject j,
where p is the durationdependence parameter and can be interpretedas representing whethermen
who were in the war longer became more or less committed soldiers. We present results both
with and without the morale variable. The hazard ratios that we report indicate whether a one
16Figure 1: Schematic of Events Studied
17unit change in an independent variable gives an increase/decrease in the odds of an event. Thus
a hazard ratio of 1.3 on our Irish-born dummy variable indicates that the Irish were 1.3 times as
likelyas thenative-borntodesert. We account forunobservedcompany-levelcorrelationbyusing
variance correction models (Lee, Wei, and Amato 1992; Cai, Wei, and Wilcox 2000). Clustering
on companies provides us with a lower bound on the standard error of company characteristics.11
7 Results
Our results show that individual characteristics, community characteristics, ideology, and morale
were all important predictors of cowardice and heroism. However, the relative importance of
these variables depends upon whether we examine desertions, arrests, AWOLs, or promotions to
ofﬁcer (see Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7).
Consider ﬁrst individual characteristics. In the case of desertion, arguably our best
measure of shirking, men who were farmers, who were older, who came from a household with
high property wealth in 1860, and who were literate were less likely to desert.12 Relative to
the native-born the Irish and British were more likely to desert. They were also twice as likely
to be arrested as the native-born. Married men were signiﬁcantly more likely to desert, but
the interaction term on married and personal property wealth was insigniﬁcant, suggesting that
ﬁnancial hardship at home did not necessarily lead to disproportionate desertions among married
11We estimate contextual interactions, wherein a soldier’s behavior varies with such exogenous characteristics of
the group as ethnic diversity. We also account for correlated effects at the company level arising from such factors
as men’s trust and opinion of the captain and lieutenants commanding the company and variation in punishments
for desertion or AWOL by company. We do not attempt to identify endogenous interactions, wherein the soldier’s
behavior varies with the behavior of the group because while we observe individualsif they move out of a company,
very few didand forthosewhodidwe cannotobserve the characteristics ofthecompany they move into. See Manski
(2000) and (1993) for a discussion of endogenous interactions, contextual effects, and correlated effects.
12Ifallmeninthesample hadcomefromthewealthiesthousehold(oneinwhichthelogarithmofpersonalproperty
wealth was 10.8), the average predicted probabilityof desertion would have been 0.056 instead of 0.094.
18Table 4: Desertion Competing Risk Hazard Model
Hazard Std Hazard Std Hazard Std















Dummy=1 if born in
US
Germany 0.888

















Height in inches at enlistment 1.002 0.007 1.002 0.008 1.002 0.008













Birth place fragmentation 1.395













































Fraction Union victories (time-varying) 0.610
z 0.075
Duration dependence parameter 0.643 0.010 0.643 0.026 0.682 0.027




Signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients 2167.81 791.23 784.32
Days until desertion are measured from ﬁrst mustering in. The symbols
￿,
y, and
z indicate that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly
different from 1 at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients is for equality of all coefﬁcients
to 1. Men who died, became POWs, were discharged, were missing in action, or changed companies before ﬁrst desertion
are treated as censored. Covariates include dummy variables indicating missing information for occupation, the 1860 census,
literacy, and county voting. Included region ﬁxed effects are for Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central,
Border, and West (New England is the omitted category).
19Table 5: Arrest Competing Risk Hazard Model
Hazard Std Hazard Std Hazard Std
Ratio Err Ratio Err Ratio Err
Dummy=1 if occupation
Farmer
Artisan 0.931 0.111 0.931 0.115 0.925 0.115
Professional/proprietor 1.038 0.181 1.038 0.196 1.132 0.195
Laborer 1.071 0.117 1.071 0.137 1.063 0.136
Dummy=1 if born in
US









Other 1.105 0.185 1.105 0.171 1.100 0.170




Height in inches at enlistment 1.011 0.016 1.011 0.017 1.012 0.017
Dummy=1 if married 1.142 0.207 1.142 0.218 1.141 0.218
Log(total household personal property), 1860 0.987 0.027 0.987 0.027 0.987 0.027
Dummy=1 if illiterate 1.087 0.361 1.087 0.315 1.076 0.314
Company characteristics








Coefﬁcient of variation for age
￿ 100 0.994 0.015 0.994 0.025 0.993 0.025
Log(population) city enlistment 1.008 0.026 1.008 0.037 1.006 0.037


















Dummy=1 if volunteer 0.851 0.127 0.851 0.145 0.854 0.144
Percent in county of enlistment voting for
Lincoln 0.993
￿ 0.004 0.993 0.004 0.994 0.004
Percent in company dying (time-varying) 0.991 0.014 0.991 0.019 0.990 0.019
Fraction Union victories (time-varying) 0.599
y 0.128
Duration dependence parameter 1.226 0.041 1.226 0.051 1.325 0.072




Signiﬁcance all coefﬁcients 492.83 336.48 349.34
Days until arrest are measured from ﬁrst mustering in. The symbols
￿,
y, and
z indicate that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly
different from 1 at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The test for signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients is for equality of
all coefﬁcients to 1. Men who died, became POWs, were discharged, were missing in action, changed companies, or deserted
before ﬁrst arrest are treated as censored. Covariates include dummy variables indicating missing information for occupation,
the 1860 census, literacy, and county voting. Included region ﬁxed effects are for Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West
North Central, Border, and West (New England is the omitted category).
20Table 6: AWOL Competing Risk Hazard Model
Hazard Std Hazard Std Hazard Std
Ratio Err Ratio Err Ratio Err
Dummy=1 if occupation
Farmer
Artisan 0.913 0.084 0.913 0.089 0.910 0.088
Professional/proprietor 1.049 0.135 1.049 0.146 1.045 0.146
Laborer 1.044 0.095 1.044 0.121 1.043 0.121
Dummy=1 if born in
US
Germany 0.862 0.116 0.862 0.144 0.857 0.143
Ireland 1.184 0.130 1.184 0.152 1.181 0.152
Great Britain 1.245 0.184 1.245 0.219 1.247 0.219
Other 0.937 0.139 0.937 0.148 0.935 0.148
Age at enlistment 1.003 0.005 1.003 0.005 1.004 0.005
Height in inches at enlistment 1.009 0.013 1.009 0.013 1.009 0.013
Dummy=1 if married 1.212 0.145 1.212 0.148 1.211 0.147
Log(total household personal property), 1860 0.969
￿ 0.018 0.969 0.021 0.968 0.021
Dummy=1 if illiterate 1.549
y 0.290 1.549 0.462 1.551 0.464
Company characteristics




Occupational fragmentation 0.753 0.193 0.753 0.374 0.759 0.376
Coefﬁcient of variation for age
￿ 100 1.014 0.011 1.014 0.022 1.014 0.022
Log(population) city enlistment 1.028 0.021 1.028 0.036 1.027 0.036








y 0.135 0.729 0.154
1864 1.185
￿ 0.117 1.185 0.200 1.326 0.232
1865 1.120 0.186 1.120 0.331 1.191 0.333













Fraction Union victories (time-varying) 0.605 0.105
Duration dependence parameter 1.206 0.032 1.206 0.043 1.298 0.050




Signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients 405.61 210.85 217.06
Days until AWOL are measured from ﬁrst mustering in. The symbols
￿,
y, and
z indicate that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly
differentfrom 1 at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients is for equalityof all coefﬁcients to
1. Men who died, became POWs, were discharged, were missing in action, changed companies, or deserted before ﬁrst AWOL
are treated as censored. Covariates include dummy variables indicating missing information for occupation, the 1860 census,
literacy, and county voting. Included region ﬁxed effects are for Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central,
Border, and West (New England is the omitted category).
21Table 7: Promotion to Ofﬁcer Competing Risk Hazard Model
Hazard Std Hazard Std Hazard Std Hazard Std













Laborer 0.983 0.202 0.983 0.190 0.999 0.194 0.974 0.181
Dummy=1if born in
US
Germany 0.770 0.202 0.770 0.219 0.785 0.224 0.569
y 0.166
Ireland 0.607 0.189 0.607 0.209 0.607 0.209 0.566
￿ 0.194
Great Britain 0.920 0.290 0.920 0.311 0.918 0.310 0.792 0.280
Other 0.713 0.212 0.713 0.245 0.705 0.241 0.601 0.203
Age at enlistment 0.999 0.009 0.999 0.010 0.998 0.010 0.998 0.010





Dummy=1if married 1.063 0.218 1.063 0.243 1.063 0.244 1.027 0.243
Log(total household personal property), 1860 1.013 0.032 1.013 0.047 1.014 0.047 0.994 0.048
Dummy=1if illiterate 0.192
￿ 0.193 0.192 0.196 0.189 0.194 0.196 0.200
Company-level measures
Birth place fragmentation 3.102




￿ 0.183 0.279 0.222
Coefﬁcient of variation for age
￿ 100 0.972
￿ 0.016 0.972 0.037 0.969 0.037 0.969 0.037




















Percent in county of enlistment voting for
Lincoln 1.004 0.005 1.004 0.008 1.003 0.007 0.997 0.007
Percent in company dying (time-varying) 1.001 0.013 1.001 0.021 1.012 0.020 1.017 0.020
Fraction Union victories (time-varying) 2.799
z 0.740 2.795
z 0.705
Duration dependence parameter 0.657 0.033 0.657 0.062 0.575 0.055 0.569 0.053
Clustered on Company N Y Y Y





Signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients 334.09 264.24 284.61 336.39
Days until promotion are measured from ﬁrst mustering in. The symbols
￿,
y, and
z indicate that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly
differentfrom1atthe10, 5, and1percentlevel, respectively. The signiﬁcanceofallcoefﬁcients isforequalityofallcoefﬁcients
to 1. Men who died, became POWs, were discharged, were missing in action, changed companies, or deserted before ﬁrst
promotiontoofﬁcerare treatedascensored. Covariatesincludedummyvariablesindicatingmissinginformationforoccupation,
the 1860 census, literacy, and county voting. Included region ﬁxed effects are for Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West
North Central, Border, and West (New England is the omitted category).
22men. Married men were more likely to be AWOL (but not signiﬁcantly so), probably because
furloughs were generally granted only to married men thus providing them with an opportunity
to go AWOL. The most important individual characteristics predicting promotion to ofﬁcer were
social status, birth place, and height. Professionals or proprietorsand artisans were more likelyto
be promoted than farmers or laborers. Men born abroad were less likely to be promoted than the
native-born and the tall were more likely to be promoted. Whether a soldier was owed a bounty
(as was true for many volunteers after 1862), decreased desertion rates (not shown), but the effect
was not statistically signiﬁcant.13
Communitycharacteristics were also importantpredictors ofcowardiceand of heroism.
Men who came from companies in which birth place, occupation, and age heterogeneity was
high were all more likely desert. Although birth place fragmentation was not a statistically
signiﬁcant predictor of desertion when we clustered on companies, it became a statistically
signiﬁcant predictor when we dropped occupational fragmentation from the regression. Men
in companies in which birth place and occupational diversity was high were signiﬁcantly more
likely to be arrested. The only company socioeconomic and demographic characteristic that
signiﬁcantly predicted AWOL was birth place diversity. Note that although high birth place
diversity is a positive, but insigniﬁcant predictor of promotion once we cluster on companies, it
becomes a negative predictor of promotion once we add dummies for Iowa and Wisconsin, the
two states with unusually high promotion rates. When we included the company Gini coefﬁcient
for both personal and property wealth calculated from the 1860 census, we found that while men
in companies where inequality was high were more likely to desert, the effect was statistically
insigniﬁcant. Men who enlisted in large cities were more likely to desert (perhaps because they
13God was not necessarily a better motivator than mammon. The higher the ratio of church seats to county of
enlistment population, the higher the desertion rate. However, this ratio is probably a proxy for urbanization. We
could ﬁnd no clear pattern by type of religion.
23faced fewer community sanctions and because they were less likely to know the men in their
company).
We havea uniqueopportunitytostudy peergroupsforbrothers, fathers,and sonsamong
men linked to the 1860 census. These men might either be more likely to shirk because collusion
is easier or be less likely to shirk because of loyalty. We ﬁnd that having close kin in the same
companyincreased theprobabilityofdesertion, butthe coefﬁcientwasnot statisticallysigniﬁcant.
It decreased signiﬁcantly decreased the odds of going AWOL and did not affect arrests.
As previouslynoted, we have notattempted toidentifyendogeneous interactions. How-
ever, because of the non-linearity of our estimation equation, the endogeneous interaction can be
estimated off of the functional form (Manksi 1993, 2000; Brock and Durlauf 2001). We there-
fore included a time-varying measure of the fraction in the company deserting in our desertion
speciﬁcation as a robustness check. We found that this measure signiﬁcantly increased desertion
rates, but that the company death rate became an insigniﬁcant predictor of desertion and that the
signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient on the proportion of Union victories fell from 1 to 10 percent. All
other coefﬁcients were unaffected.
We ﬁnd no evidenceof a true“dark” side of social capital, but we do ﬁndsome evidence
of ethnic favoritism. We did not ﬁnd that company characteristics predicted battleﬁeld mortality
among men, suggesting that more homogeneous companies were not successful in colluding to
straggle away from the front lines. We investigated whether there was any interaction between
own ethnicity and that of a company ofﬁcer for the limited set of companies for which we know
something about the ofﬁcers because they rose from the ranks. In the case of AWOL, the Irish
were signiﬁcantly more likely to be AWOL if the company had an Irish ofﬁcer, but we could not
determine if punishments for AWOL were lower in these companies. However, both the Irish and
the British were more likely to be arrested if the company contained an Irish or British ofﬁcer
and the British were signiﬁcantly less likely to desert if the contained a British ofﬁcer. We also
24investigated whether the interactions between own occupation and the proportion of men in the
company in that occupation and own birth place and the proportion of men of that ethnicity were
at all signiﬁcant. The Irish were less likelyto be arrested if the proportionof Irish in the company
was high. Soldiers were more likely to desert if the at least 50 percent of the company was Irish,
but the Irish were signiﬁcantly less likelyto desert if at least 50 percent of the company was Irish.
Artisans were less likely to desert or to be arrested if the proportion of artisans in the company
was high. However, laborers were more likely to desert and to be arrested if the proportion of
laborers in the company was high.
Ideology predicted desertion, arrest, and AWOL, but not promotion to ofﬁcer. Men
who enlisted in 1861 were less likely to desert or to be arrested. Surprisingly, soldiers mustered
in 1862 and 1863 were less likely to be AWOL than soldiers mustered in 1861 and men mustered
in 1865 were more likely to be promoted than men mustered in 1861. However, men mustered in
1861 were more likely to be promoted than men mustered in 1862-1864. Men who volunteered
and men from pro-Lincoln counties were less likely to desert or to be AWOL. We ﬁnd mixed
evidence that soldiers became more committed to the cause the longer they remained in the army.
Although desertion hazards decrease with time, arrest and AWOL hazards increase with time and
promotion hazards decrease with time.
Lastly, morale was a predictor of all of our measures of cowardice and of heroism. Men
were more likely to desert when company mortality was high and when the Union was losing.
Arrest rates were higher when the Union was losing. A high company mortality rate signiﬁcantly
reduced time until AWOL. When the Union was winning time until promotion to ofﬁcer was
shorter perhaps because enlisted men exerted extra effort and therefore were more likely to be
promoted.
We experimented with different outcome variables. We investigated what predicted
re-enlistment for another 3 year term among men who enlisted in 1861 and who had already
25served a 3 year term. Approximately half of re-enlistees in the sample received a bounty upon
re-enlistment. Generallymen re-enlisted as regiments or companies (Hess 1997: 89). Older men,
men from large cities, and Germans were less likely to re-enlist and men who received a bounty
for re-enlisting were more likelyto re-enlist, but these were the only characteristics that predicted
re-enlistment.14 We also combined desertion, arrest, and AWOL as one outcome measure of
“cowardice,” ﬁnding that birth place and occupational fragmentation, age diversity, enlisting in
a large city, enlisting at a late date, a small pro-Lincoln vote, a high company death rate, a low
fraction of Union victories, and being a non-farmer, Irish, or British rather than native-born,
younger, poorer, and illiterate all led to higher cowardice rates.
We performed further robustness tests by experimenting with state ﬁxed effects for
all regressions. When we combined desertion, arrest, and AWOL as one outcome measure of
“cowardice,” we found that difﬁculties we faced is that when the number of companies within a
state was small correlation between birth place and occupational fragmentation was high. In the
case of promotion to ofﬁcer, AWOL, and arrest, the coefﬁcients on company socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics, the percentage of the county voting for Lincoln, and the company
death rate remained unchanged. For desertion, both birth place and occupational fragmentation
were statistically signiﬁcant predictors of desertion, but the proportion of the county voting for
Lincoln (a measure that varies more across states than within states) became an insigniﬁcant
predictor.
14There was no dishonorin not re-enlisting. Newton Scott, a private in the 36th Iowa Infantry, Company A, wrote
to Hannah Cone, “I thinkitthe Dutyof Every Able Bodiedman If Necessary to Help Defend His countryBut I think
3 years Sufﬁcient long for one man to Serve while they all take there [sic] turns...” http://www.civilwarletters.com
26Table 8: Predicted Probabilities of Desertion, Arrest, AWOL, and Promotion to Ofﬁcer By
Company Characteristics, Morale, and Ideology
Desertion Arrest AWOL Promotion
Using true variable values 0.094 0.020 0.033 0.011
Community characteristics
If birthplace fragmentation=0 0.078 0.010 0.019 0.010
If occupational fragmentation=0 0.047 0.010 0.039 0.019
If coefﬁcient of variation for age=0 0.042 0.023 0.023 0.025
If all of above 0.016 0.006 0.016 0.043
If population in city of enlistment=2500 0.088 0.020 0.032 0.011
If all of above 0.015 0.006 0.015 0.042
Morale
If company death rate=0 0.084 0.020 0.027 0.010
If fraction Union victories=1 0.067 0.015 0.034 0.021
If both 0.060 0.022 0.028 0.020
Ideology
If volunteer 0.091 0.020 0.032
If 86.6% county voted for Lincoln 0.079 0.015 0.022 0.009
If mustered in 1861 0.066 0.015 0.039 0.015
If all of above 0.054 0.011 0.025 0.013
Desertion, AWOL, and arrestprobabilitiesare predictedfromthe thirdspeciﬁcationsinTables 4, 5, and6, respectively.
Promotion to ofﬁcer is predicted from the fourth speciﬁcation in Table 7. In this sample, the largest share of the vote
Lincoln received in a county was 86.6%. Cities with a populationof less than 2500 were not even listed in the census
and are therefore considered small towns.
8 Implications for Organizational Design
What do our results imply about designing a well functioning military organization? Table 8
shows the relative importance of community socioeconomic and demographic characteristics,
morale, and ideology for the predicted probability of desertion, arrest, AWOL, and promotion to
ofﬁcer. (This table also provides a good indication of the magnitude of the coefﬁcients on our
variables.) In the case of desertion the single most important variables were age and occupational
diversity within the company. In the case of arrests, birth place and occupational fragmentation,
27thefractionofUnionvictories, thepercentageofthe countyvotingforLincoln, andyearofmuster
were the single most important predictors. Birth place diversity, age diversity and the fraction
of the county voting for Lincoln were the most important predictors of AWOL. The single most
importantpredictorsofpromotionto ofﬁcerwere agediversityand thefractionofUnionvictories.
On the whole company socioeconomic and demographic characteristics were the most important
predictors of desertion, arrest, AWOL, and promotion to ofﬁcer. Morale was relatively more
important than ideology for promotionto ofﬁcerand ideology was relatively more importantthan
morale for desertion, arrest, and AWOL.
Why does the Army today not make greater use of social capital by creating socio-
economic and demographicallyhomogeneous ﬁghting units? Two reasons include diversiﬁcation
and human capital specialization in the modern army. Drawing companies on the local level
ended after highly-publicized losses to communities during World War II. In the modern army,
soldiers performa myriad of tasks requiringdifferenttraining. Because their skills are not perfect
substitutes, the modern army is more likely to face a bundling problem which inhibits it from
achieving the high level of social capital that the “old” army could achieve.
9 Conclusion
What motivates loyaltyto an organization? Is it the attributesof a person, the socio-economic and
demographic characteristics of the organization, the attributes of the organization’s leader, belief
in the organization’s mission, or self-interest? Recent studies have argued that sacriﬁce among
Ultra-Orthodox Jews provides them with self-insurance beneﬁts (Berman 2000) and that loyalty
to street gangs can provide future riches (Levitt and Venkatesh 2000). Iannaccone (1992) argues
that efﬁcient religions may beneﬁt from self-sacriﬁce because of free rider problems. In contrast,
loyal Union Army soldiers gained little monetary compensation, only the knowledge that they
28could hold their heads high among their comrades and in their home towns (McPherson 1997:
77-84). In such an organizationcreatinggrouployaltyis ofparamountimportance. Grouployalty
in the Civil War was the “cement of the armies,” allowing both the Union and the Confederacy
to mount comprehensive military efforts even though indiscipline was chronic, military training
scant, and the system of military justice weak (Linderman 1987: 35-36).
How was this grouployaltycreated? Individualsocio-economicand demographicchar-
acteristics, company socio-economic and demographic characteristics, ideological committment,
and morale were all important determinants of group loyalty among Union Army soldiers in the
Civil War. Company socio-economic and demographic characteristics were particulary impor-
tant, even more so than ideological committment and morale. However, while homogeneous
companies were more successful in accomplishing the short-run goal of ﬁelding full companies,
we cannotascertain whether therewereany long-runbeneﬁts ofbeingin a heterogenouscompany
to individual soldiers.
Data Appendix
This appendix describes the construction of our demographic and socio-economic variables, our
community variables, our ideology variables, and our morale variables. All data on Union Army
recruits are obtained from Aging of Veterans of the Union Army, Robert W. Fogel, Principal
Investigator, http://www.cpe.uchicago.edu.
Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics
1. Dependent variable. We calculated days from muster until desertion, arrest, AWOL, or
promotion to ofﬁcer. We allowed for censoring by also calculating days from muster until
death, discharge, changing company, becoming prisoner of war, or missing in action.
2. Occupation. Dummy variables indicating whether at enlistment the recruit reported his
occupation as farmer, artisan, professional or proprietor, or laborer. Farmers’ sons who
29were not yet farmers in their own right would generally report themselves as farmers.
3. BirthplaceDummyvariables indicatingwhether atenlistment the recruitreportedhis birth
place as the US, Germany, Ireland, Great Britain, or other.
4. Age at enlistment. Age at ﬁrst enlistment.
5. Height in inches. Height in inches at ﬁrst enlistment.
6. Married in 1860. This variable is inferred from family member order and age in the 1860
census. This variable was set equal to 0 if the recruit was not linked to the 1860 census.
7. Log(total household personal property) in 1860. This variable is the sum of personal
property wealth of everyone in the recruits’ 1860 household. This variable is set equal to 0
is the recruit was not linked to the 1860 census.
8. Missing census information. A dummy equal to one if the recruit was not linked to the
1860 census. Linkage rates from the military service records to the 1860 census were 57
percent. The main characteristic that predicted linkage failure was foreign birth.
9. Illiterate. This variable is from the 1860 census and provides illiteracy information only
for those age 20 and older.
10. Missing illiteracy information. A dummy equal to one if we do not know whether the
recruits was illiterate, either because he was not linked to the 1860 census or because he
was less than age 20 in 1860.
11. Region effects. Our region dummies are New England, Middle Atlantic, East North
Central, West North Central, Border, and West.
Community Characteristics
1. Birth placefragmentation. We calculated, by company, the fractionof individualsbornin
the US inNew England, in the Middle Atlantic, in the East NorthCentral, inthe West North
Central, the Border states, the south, and the west and born abroad in Germany, Ireland,
Canada, Great Britain, Scandinavia, northwestern Europe (France, Belgium, Luxembourg,
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302. Occupational fragmentation. We calculated, by company, the fraction of individuals
who were farmers, higher class professionals and proprietors, lower class professionals and
proprietors, artisans, higher class laborers, lower class laborers, and unknown. Our occu-
pational fragmentation index is then calculated similarly to our birthplace fragmentation
index.
3. Coefﬁcient of variation for age. We calculated, by company, the coefﬁcient of variation
for age at enlistment.
4. Populationincity ofenlistment. We obtainedpopulation incity of enlistment fromUnion
Army Recruits in White Regiments in the United States, 1861-1865 (ICPSR 9425), Robert
W. Fogel, Stanley L. Engerman, Clayne Pope, and Larry Wimmer, Principal Investigators.
Cities that could not be identiﬁed were assumed to be cities of population less than 2,500.
Ideology Variables
1. Year of muster. Dummy variables indicating the year that the soldier was ﬁrst mustered
in.
2. Volunteer. A dummy equal to one if the recruit was a volunteer instead of a draftee or a
substitute.
3. Percent of vote in 1860 Presidential election. We obtained by county of enlistment
the fraction of the vote case for Lincoln and for other candidates from Electoral Data
for Counties in the United States: Presidential and Congressional Races, 1840-1972
(ICPSR 8611), Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, Principal
Investigators. Because we cannot attribute a county to each recruit, our categories are
percent in county of enlistment voting for Lincoln, other candidate, and unknown.
Morale Variables
1. Fractionincompanydying. Wecalculated, bycompany, thefractiondyingoverallandthe
fraction dying (among all men at risk to die) within all half years that each recruit served.
Our means present the fraction dying overall. Our regression results use the time-varying
covariate, fraction of men at risk dying during all half years that each recruit served.
2. Fraction of major Union victories. This is a time-varying variable that indicates for each
half year that the recruit was in the service the fractionof majorUnion victories to all major
battles in that half-year. It takes the value 0 if there were no major battles.
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